Last updated 12.17.25. This is the most comprehensive climate change, temperature, and time-frame forecast ever produced by our think tank in collaboration with Job One For Humanity.

Section Overview

Sections 1-10 are essential reading for everyone. Sections 11-15 are geared more toward other climate change researchers and individuals who want to verify the accuracy of the very unsettling new forecasts of climate change consequences and timeframes. The sections below discuss various aspects of climate change forecasts, including the processes involved, the context in which they're created, the unique relationships within the climate system and within the organizations that produce them, and the transformations that result from these factors.

1. Prologue

2. How to compare our new forecasts with the United Nations' Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (the IPCC) current climate change temperature and timetable forecasts from now until 2100.

3. Critical information about our four new climate change temperature and timeframe forecast graphs to help you grasp the seriousness of the IPCC's current forecasting inaccuracy problem.

4. Here are our 2025 new low, medium, and high (worst-case) scenario climate change temperature and timeframe forecasts.

5. Things to notice when comparing the IPCC's two graphs to our four graphs and the very significantly different forecasts we have produced.

6. Our three forecast additional graphs showing the difference as global fossil fuel use increases by 1, 2, or 3 percent annually.

7. A critical time frame review of the most destructive tipping points, feedback loops, and non-linear reactions which are likely to unfold within the climate and its subsystems. (These relate directly to your future wellbeing and survival, and our new temperature in the timetable forecasts below.)

8. What does our new forecast mean to your future finances, businesses, personal goals, and survival?

9. Nine things you can do about this climate change consequence and temperature forecast nightmare.

10. Contrarian good news about the future of climate change, humanity, and a special Mother Nature's surprise support and assistance.

11. Why are our climate change temperature and timeframe forecasts so different from the IPCC's forecasts?

12. More climate-related technical information, including the criteria, formulas, definitions, and methodology we used in our forecasts, so that anyone can independently verify our newest forecasts.

13. Bibliography, additional methods, and sources.

14. Additional technical notes.

15. Useful additional reading and links.

1. Prologue

1. You are about to read what every well-funded intelligence agency, military organization, and top-tier risk assessment firm charging billionaires and the world's wealthiest corporations sky-high monthly fees already know but keep as a tightly held secret. They keep the most accurate information confidential because it provides them with significant strategic, economic, corporate, military, or national preparation advantages. Another reason this information is kept secret from the public is that if the public truly understood the danger they were in because of the context of decades of the global fossil fuel cartel's influence, deception, and disinformation due to the serious underestimation of the UN, IPCC climate change forecasts and summary reports, also below, there would be widespread public panic.

At Job One For Humanity, we believe that every citizen should have the same access to information essential to their survival as the privileged ultra-wealthy organizations do. Consequently, we provide the uncensored, unedited climate change information to the general public worldwide. Please distribute this article, or any pages from our website, to everyone you believe should receive them for their protection.

2. To give you a simple starting point for the depth of this underestimation problem, we only need to mention that the IPCC has, for decades, been telling the general public through worldwide media that humanity should not reach an average global temperature increase over pre-industrial levels of 2°C until about 2100. Our new, uncensored forecasts indicate that humanity is poised to reach an average global temperature increase above pre-industrial levels of 2°C as early as 2031. That is a very dangerous 70-year forecast-prediction gap and difference that, if accurate, no one in the general public is remotely prepared to address.

3. The article methodology we have provided below allows any individual or group with good mathematical skills to duplicate the same calculations and processes we used, and that major intelligence agencies and risk analysis firms also used to produce a far more accurate climate change forecast than what the public is being given by the IPCC, your government, or the media.

4. In the forecast below, we use some climate change terminology that may be unfamiliar; however, you should still be able to quickly grasp the key points, and many terms include links to more detailed explanations. If some of the climate science and terminology seem a bit much, simply compare the first two illustrations on the page to our four final illustrations on the page, sections two through eight. You will quickly learn everything you need to know about how soon and how much climate change is going to accelerate and adversely affect your life, business, and nation.

2. How to compare our new forecasts with the United Nations IPCC's current climate change, temperature, and timetable forecasts from now until 2100

In this article, you will find considerable criticism of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and its administrators and authors of its summary reports. Please do not conflate or confuse any administrative criticism of the IPCC with any criticism of the independent climate change scientists and researchers who submit their honest work, based on their own climate system or subsystem specialties, to the IPCC for evaluation and use. These independent scientists and researchers have no real control over how IPCC administrators and summary report writers alter, omit, or change critical new climate science under the tremendous political pressures they face. Unfortunately, the IPCC's summary reports remain the world's leading source of accurate information on climate change.

Below are the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) forecasts and our forecasts for average global temperature increases from pre-industrial levels, along with approximate timelines for when these temperatures are expected to occur. The first two sets of forecasts (charts) below are from the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The IPCC's forecasts are for the low, medium, and high scenarios for climate change, temperature, and timelines, which most governments, corporations, and nonprofit educational organizations worldwide use.

Review these IPCC scenarios first, as they are currently the most used and trusted worldwide. Reviewing the IPCC scenarios first will also help you understand the key differences in our latest forecasts, which incorporate all factors the IPCC's AR6 report omitted, miscalculated, or overlooked, whether intentionally or unintentionally.

Please also keep in mind that if the IPCC's baseline temperature and timeframe calculations are significantly incorrect or underestimated, (as we will demonstrate to you in our newest forecasts and in our forecast verification notes in sections 11 and 12 below), this will also mean that the climate change solutions that the IPCC is putting forward for the correct annual amount of global fossil fuel use reductions, and the date we must reach those emission reductions (or net zero carbon emissions) will also be incorrect and significantly underestimated. That, of course, also means that all the international climate conferences and current international agreements aimed at reducing global fossil fuel use, based on the IPCC's forecasts, are significantly flawed and significantly underestimate the correct global fossil fuel reduction solution. If the IPCC's forecasts are seriously underestimated, as we will attempt to prove to you below, it also removes the critical public urgency to address the climate change emergency that would naturally arise if people actually understood its seriousness.

Here are the IPCC low, medium, and high forecasts:

3. Critical information about our four new climate change temperature and timeframe forecast graphs to help you grasp the seriousness of the IPCC's current forecasting inaccuracy problem

To create our four forecasts shown below, we relied solely on the most recent peer-reviewed climate change research cited or referenced in the United Nations IPCC's AR6 summary report. This means that anyone who wishes to challenge our new forecasts below must use only the original IPCC AR6 peer-reviewed research studies and their numbers, then plug in the calculations, variables, and methodologies we fully disclose near the bottom of this article in section 12, and repeat our calculations. They will then be able to see for themselves how we came to the numbers used in our new forecasts below.

Our temperature and timetable forecasts below show what the uncensored and corrected climate change temperatures and timeframes look like when you remove incorrect climate change critical factors, correct the process errors, and add missing factors that include the following:

1. You use James Hansen's far more accurate estimate of 4.5 for climate sensitivity (ECS), not the current underestimated value of 3.0 used by the IPCC.

2. You remove all of the false and unachievable new technology carbon capture allowances and calculations for future mechanical carbon capture removal that were backed into the climate calculations done by the IPCC. There is no reliable science on new-technology carbon capture today, nor is there a scalable approach that is economically or logistically feasible to achieve the IPCC's projected targets for new-technology carbon capture removal. The IPCC incorrectly included, in the two illustrations above, future large-scale carbon removals from the atmosphere by the new carbon capture technology. The IPCC literally "cooked the books" on this with just plain fossil fuel cartel-favoring accounting. Click here for the full story on the mechanical carbon capture new-technology delusion.

3. You create projections for several scenarios of increasing, realistic annual global fossil fuel use. The graphs below present low-, medium-, and high-projection scenarios for 1%, 2%, and 3% annual growth in global fossil fuel use.

4. You use reasonable, defensible, and even conservative calculations (the "adders" factors described in more detail in section 11 below) for the almost always unaccounted-for effects of the various climate system-triggered tipping points, activated feedback loops, and activated non-linear reactions within the climate and its subsystems occurring over the displayed time periods.

5. You always include calculations for the cooling effect of aerosols.

6. You remove the numerous errors and omissions of the IPCC in their summary reports, like AR6,

Additionally, our first forecast graph below also illustrates the result of how the IPCC's original forecast also should have been adjusted if you had also compensated for the following well-known "contextual" influences and pressures upon the final IPCC summary reports. Understanding the historical context of decades of gross underestimation of public climate change forecasts is critical. Prior or existing context typically constrains the upper and lower bounds of any action permitted or underway within the specific context. (When you read this influence, misinformation, and disinformation of the global fossil fuel cartel link, you will understand how a corrupted context has produced decades of corrupted climate change forecasts.)

Here are additional well-known "contextual" influences and pressures corrupting the final IPCC summary reports.

a. the invisible influence, misinformation, and disinformation of the global fossil fuel cartel.

b. the politicization of climate science.

Section 11, further below, explains the two above critical contextual influences and differences in greater detail.

4. Here are our 2025 new low, medium, and high (worst-case) scenario climate change temperature and timeframe forecasts.

(We repeat the IPCC's low, medium, and high (worst-case) scenarios a little farther down the page so you can easily see just how radically different they are at a glance.)

For a quick, easy comparison, the IPCC three-scenario graph is shown below.

5. Things to notice when comparing the IPCC's very significantly different forecast two graphs --- to our one graph above and three graphs further below.

A. By 2030, the IPCC is still forecasting a 1.5°C average global temperature increase beyond pre-industrial levels. By 2030, we forecast a 2°C, 2.5°C, or, in our worst-case scenario, a 3°C increase in global temperatures. (Just a 2°C increase in the average global temperature above pre-industrial levels is a nightmare and is predicted to eventually kill up to 2 billion people. We will cross many more tipping points, trigger feedback loops, and produce numerous nonlinear responses within the climate and its subsystems once we cross the 2°C threshold. These crossed tipping points and triggered feedback loops and nonlinear reactions are part of what creates the significant differences in temperature and timeframes from the IPCC forecast, as illustrated in our forecast chart above.)

B. The IPCC's worst-case scenario barely comes close to our lowest best-case scenario. In fact, our best-case scenario is actually significantly worse than their worst-case scenario.

Even at the lowest levels and in our most pessimistic prediction scenario, our temperatures will rise far faster and sooner than the IPCC currently forecasts. For example, a 3°C increase by 2040 (in our lowest forecast) would trigger "Hell on Earth." A temperature increase of almost 4 °C by 2040 in our middle scenario would make life unbearable and unlivable for half of humanity by 2050. And that's just our lowest- and middle-forecast scenarios. If you examine our medium- and high-scenario forecasts, you will see how much faster we will reach near-total extinction temperatures of about 5°C or higher.

C. Although both graphs from the IPCC and our forecasts cover the period from now until 2100, they have markedly different Celsius degree scales. This is important to keep in mind when examining line-slope angles when comparing the IPCC's forecast graphs to ours. The Celsius temperature scale in the IPCC graph only rises to about 4.5°C by 2100. The scale on our graph and forecasts rises close to 16° by 2100. That is a significant difference in how quickly temperatures rise on our graphs compared with those in the IPCC. (Please note that the IPCC does have a past forecast for 2100 that does rise to about 7 to 8° Celsius.)

D. The significantly underestimated IPCC three scenarios also mean that the IPCC has significantly underestimated the amount of global fossil fuel reductions that are critically needed to keep humanity from going into climate change consequence chaos. This means almost every IPCC report you hear about how much we need to reduce global fossil fuel usage is significantly underestimated and largely ineffective for preventing the worst of widespread climate change-driven catastrophe.

6. Our Other three forecast graphs show the difference as global fossil fuel use increases by 1, 2, or 3 percent annually.

The following three graphs break down our larger graph above. They present the three most reasonable scenarios for annual fossil fuel increases of 1%, 2%, and 3%, making it easier to compare the high, low, and medium future annual global fossil fuel usage increase scenarios. All other factors in the three graphs below are exactly the same as in the main graph above.

The first graph shows everything else remaining the same, except that global fossil fuel use grows by only 1% per year. According to the International Energy Agency's World Energy Outlook (Nov 2025), global energy demand rose by 1.6% per year between 2015 and 2024. (In the CPS (business as usual, it predicts increases by 1.2% annually to 2035, adding demand equivalent to that of the United States today. Emerging markets and developing economies account for 90% of the increase.)

After 2035, the IPCC predicts that the annual average demand growth will slow to 0.8%. (We do not trust the reliability of current IPCC estimates or forecasts of future global fossil fuel use due to the many national and corporate financial conflicts of interest involved in such predictions. (More will be said about projected global annual fossil fuel use increases further below.)

The second and third graphs below, which show 2% and 3% annual increases in global fossil fuel use, respectively, when all other factors in our updated forecast remain constant, are also highly relevant. They are more likely to be accurate about our future for the following reasons. The IEA's current policies scenario (business as usual) projects that oil demand could rise by 11% and gas demand by 31% by 2050 relative to current levels, while coal demand would fall by about 20%. Coal is at a record high now and is forecast to remain at today's record level, with no expectation of an increase.

Additionally, the following link to the ProductionGap.org report may be the best predictor of global fossil fuel use. See (https://productiongap.org/). (In our additional reference material at the bottom of the page section 13, we have included the UCAR annual fossil fuel use prediction chart to further help you visualize how temperatures will rise under different annual global rates of fossil fuel increase.)

7. A critical time frame review of the most destructive tipping points, feedback loops, and non-linear reactions which are likely to unfold within the climate and its subsystems.

The next section below contains a compact chart of “what climate change tipping points, feedback loops, and non-linearities will occur at what temperatures and at what time ranges,” for our forecast above. There are a few important things to know when reviewing the tipping point, feedback loop, and non-linear reactions in the climate system and subsystem below:

1. Every rapid degree of Celsius increase makes powerful changes and differences in the quality of our future. New research finds that for every 1 °C rise in temperature, global conflicts increase by 4%. Increasing local, regional, and international conflicts, while climate change consequences accelerate, is a recipe for global catastrophe that will likely come faster than climate change consequences alone.

2. With every 1 degree C of temperature increase, the world's evaporation rate increases by 7%. That means what goes up must come down, and rainfall will increase dramatically around the world, but mostly not in its usual patterns. We will experience multiple rain events, with 20 to 30 inches of rain over a one- to three-day period. Worldwide, we will experience more frequent, sudden flooding of rivers and lakes due to a massive increase in rainfall, mostly occurring more often at the wrong times and in the wrong places.

3. New climate research indicates that ocean reefs have already reached a level of global collapse, suggesting a potential collapse of the world's fish stocks, which provide much of the protein to many impoverished regions. As fish stocks collapse, paralleling the reef collapse, mass starvation will ravage impoverished nations, leading to migrations and new conflicts.

Below are also the highest-confidence/systemically important processes expected at each temperature level. “Likely window” here means first emergence to widespread/locked-in risk; earlier appearance at regional scales is possible.

At only a 2 °C increase in average global temperature

- Arctic summer sea-ice loss becomes frequent to near-ice-free years (albedo feedback; more solar absorption; regional amplification).
- Permafrost-carbon release is clearly underway (CO₂ + CH₄); sink weakening on land/ocean accelerates (higher airborne fraction).
- Coral reefs: global mass-bleaching becomes near-annual in the warmest basins; large-scale functional collapse.
- Ice-sheet thresholds are being approached: Greenland surface mass loss increases strongly; WAIS (West Antarctica) vulnerability grows (hydrofracture, grounding-line retreat), but the multi-decadal to centennial sea-level response remains uncertain.
- Monsoon/hydroclimate variability increases (wet-gets-wetter/dry-gets-drier), fire regimes intensify (boreal + Mediterranean ecosystems).

Our Timetables:

Low: ~2030 | Medium: ~2028 | High: ~2027

At 2 degrees C, the climate system goes into Hot House Earth mode. It would be wise to think of 2°C as the point of no return. (On the Job One for Humanity website, we call this phase 2 irreversible global warming.)

At only a 3 °C increase in average global temperature

- AMOC: continued weakening is likely; risk envelope for transition to a much weaker state widens (freshwater forcing from Greenland melt increases); large North Atlantic & European climate disruptions possible if thresholds crossed.
- Amazon & boreal forest dieback risk: cumulative drought/fire stress → regional tipping clusters (carbon-source behavior).
- Wetland CH₄ emissions are appreciably higher; methane lifetime feedback strengthens → CO₂e rises faster than CO₂ alone.
- Cryosphere: multi-meter sea-level commitment grows (centuries), with higher odds of self-sustaining retreat in WAIS sectors.
- Food systems: multi-breadbasket heat extremes and water stress → serial harvest shocks become plausible.

Our Timetables:

Low: ~2044 | Medium: ~2035 | High: ~2032

When the world hits the 3 to 4°C increase above pre-industrial levels, we will begin to experience mass extinction, and life on Earth will become hell.

At only a 4 °C increase in average global temperature

- High probability of large, compounding carbon-cycle feedbacks: permafrost + peat + boreal dieback + wetlands → amplified warming (harder stabilization).
- AMOC tipping risk enters low-to-moderate territory (not a forecast, but the possibility of a rapid state shift becomes non-negligible); major regional climate flips if it occurs.
- Antarctic marine ice-sheet instability: growing chance of rapid dynamic loss in vulnerable basins; multi-decadal sea-level rise acceleration.
- Persistent megadrought/heat in subtropics; wet-bulb extremes begin to challenge outdoor labor viability seasonally in the hottest regions.

Our Timetables:

Low: ~2059 | Medium: ~2043 | High: ~2037

At only a 5 °C increase in average global temperature

- System-wide non-linear cascades increasingly plausible: mutually reinforcing cryosphere–ocean–biosphere feedbacks can outpace linear expectations.
- Major circulation regime risks: AMOC very weak or transitioned; potential Antarctic Bottom Water formation reduction with global knock-ons.
- Habitability & food security: multi-region unviability spikes (wet-bulb >31–33 °C events more frequent), agricultural belts shift/contract; fishery collapses expand via marine heatwaves/deoxygenation.
- Large coastal exposure: SLR acceleration from dynamic ice loss + thermal expansion; high-end late-century SLR tracks become plausible.

Our Timetables:

Low: ~2074 | Medium: ~2050 | High: ~2042

At 5° or more, we are looking at the near-total extinction of humanity.

At only a 6 °C increase in average global temperature

- Very high risk of runaway-like behavior in sub-systems (not Venus-style runaway, but self-reinforcing Earth-system warming beyond policy control).
- Widespread forest biome conversion (savannization, boreal to steppe), massive carbon release from soils/peat/permafrost; strong CH₄ from wetlands and shallow permafrost lakes.
- Ice-sheet retreat becomes difficult to halt: multi-meter SLR commitment essentially locked (centuries), with decadal-scale accelerations possible.
- Chronic global food deficits, severe water scarcity, and persistent disaster clustering (flood/heat/fire) overwhelm response capacity.

Our Timetables:

Low: ~2088 | Medium: ~2058 | High: ~2047

At only a 7 °C increase in average global temperature

- Potential emergence of extreme cloud–radiation feedbacks in subtropical regimes (risk space for low-cloud instability grows at very high CO₂e); uncertainty is large, but consequences would be abrupt additional warming.
- Major overturning circulations (AMOC/AABW) plausibly re-organized or collapsed → global hydroclimate reshuffling and oxygenation declines in oceans.
- Large-scale uninhabitability in the hottest regions; global food system fragmentation and mass migration pressures dominating geopolitics.

Our Timetables:

Low: unlikely by 2100 | Medium: ~2065 | High: ~2053 (It is already so bad at 7°C that we did not continue predictions beyond that level.)

Below is an additional chart showing when each temperature level is reached across the low, medium, and high scenarios, with annual fossil fuel consumption increasing by 1, 2, or 3%.

ΔT above 1850–1900	Low scenario (1%/yr)	Medium (2%/yr)	High (3%/yr)
2.0 °C	2030	2028	2027
3.0 °C	2044	2035	2032
4.0 °C	2059	2043	2037
5.0 °C	2074	2050	2042
6.0 °C	2088	2058	2047
7.0 °C	—	2065	205

How to read/apply the above tipping point, feedback loop, and non-linear reaction section for the climate and its subsystems.

- The earlier the temperature threshold is reached (see the table above), the less time for adaptation and the greater the overlap among tipping processes (cascades).
- The items above are not guarantees at a given °C; they represent risk envelopes that widen significantly and quickly as temperatures rise.
- Our Low/Medium/High scenarios are defined by 1%/2%/3% annual CO₂e growth, no carbon capture, a Hansen ECS of 4.5, and a conservative adder for underrepresented Earth-system feedbacks.
- For planning, treat each threshold as a policy & preparedness milestone, with specific monitoring indicators (AMOC strength, Greenland/Antarctica mass balance, permafrost CH₄ fluxes, Amazon fire/drought indices, wet-bulb trends, etc.).

8. What does this new forecast mean to your future finances, businesses, personal goals, and survival?

In general, no one other than the major intelligence agencies and top-tier risk and analysis firms is aware of, or even remotely prepared for the consequences of our more accurate climate change forecast above. Being blindsided like this, and having the climate change scenario so much worse than you were told, destabilizes many of the plans that individuals, businesses, and nations have put forward for themselves.

The following are some ways to think about the consequences of our new forecast for different types of individuals, businesses, or national interests:

1. Personally: Enjoy your life now. Do not put off things you really want to do or your dreams. Think about what your expected lifespan is, and then look at our climate change predictions once again. By about 2030, the accelerating consequences of climate change will make personal finances and basic survival increasingly difficult for an ever-growing number of people worldwide.

The primary and secondary consequences of climate change are accelerating faster than most people can adequately prepare for or adapt to, and this will only get worse over time. You have considerably less time to get prepared and reorder your life than what the IPCC has been telling the world for many decades. Almost no person, business, or nation is prepared for the accelerating pace of unpredictable and unprecedented primary and secondary consequences that will soon affect nearly every individual, family, business, and nation. Wise individuals will start rethinking and replanning the remainder of their lives in light of these forecasts.

2. Personally: Our government's climate change PLAN A has totally failed over the last 60 years. Worse yet, we are now losing the climate change battle at an even faster rate than over the last 60 years. Many of the most catastrophic consequences of global warming and climate change are no longer avoidable.

It is hard to admit or face, but humanity is already in the second phase of irreversible global warming, and we have already lost a MAJOR battle against climate change, but not the war. It is now highly uncertain whether we can re-stabilize the climate for many decades to centuries, returning it to near pre-industrial levels. It is highly doubtful that we will be able to secure a safe, stable climate and future for current and future generations against the growing effects of climate change.

Losing this critical battle against climate change does not mean giving up; it means redoubling our efforts to combat it. There are many steps we still need to take to prepare, adapt, and save as much as possible.

Current credible die-off forecasts are that 2 billion people will die when the average global temperature rises to 2°C above preindustrial levels. Even our lowest new forecast projects that we will reach a 2°C increase in average global temperature by around 2030. That doesn't leave much time for you, your family, and your business to prepare for emergencies, adapt, build resilience, and, potentially, migrate. After we reach 2°C, average global temperatures are expected to rise rapidly over the coming decades to 3°C, 4°C, and beyond, driven by climate change tipping points, feedback loops, and non-linear responses that more rapidly accelerate the temperature rise.

Accordingly, it is now imperative that individuals, businesses, and nations immediately begin their PLAN B. This way, regular citizens, businesses, and every nation will have nearly the same chance to survive what is coming as the privileged ultra-wealthy, top executives of multinational mega-corporations, and the political elite of the world's most powerful nations.

Things are going to get so bad so fast that it is also important to look at what will happen to the people who ignore good climate change science. If you live between the 40th parallel North and the 40th parallel South, particularly between the 35th parallel North and the 35th parallel South, you are in medium- to high-risk areas for climate change, except for a few microlimates.

This means that if you are not prepared for what lies ahead, you will likely experience a series of financial losses due to flooding, fires, extreme heat and humidity, and other primary and secondary consequences of climate change. Your insurance companies will likely increase your rates or cancel your policy, and the value of your homes, businesses, and other property in those medium- to high-risk areas will continue to decline steadily as more people realize conditions will only worsen as climate change accelerates.

In the US, if you live in Florida, on the northeast coast, the Gulf Coast, or the southwest, you are in mostly high-to medium-risk areas, with Florida being the worst. If you live in Southern Europe, you are in a high-risk zone, except in areas at higher elevations and with lots of water. Much of China and Southeast Asia is also a medium to high-risk zone. Australia is one of the highest-risk areas globally. Most of Central and South America, as well as Africa, are also medium to high-risk areas, except for higher elevations and certain microclimates.

3. If you are an investment banker, hedge fund, brokerage, or other large financial bank or other financial-related institution (like BlackRock, Vanguard Group, Fidelity Investments, State Street Global Advisors, J.P. Morgan Asset Management, The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank), you will need to add new legal disclaimers to all of your investment contracts and offerings for any investment that may last over five years, disclosing that rapidly accelerating climate change could be a significant factor in determining the success or failure of any investment your clients may participate in. If you do not inform your clients who lose their investments because of the primary and secondary consequences of climate change rapidly accelerating, they will be able to come back and sue you for their losses due to your failure to disclose known significant investment horizon risks, negligence, or gross negligence. If it can be shown that you were aware of this information at the time of previous contracts or purchases, you could be sued for any climate change losses going back to the original time you were informed of these severe risks and threats to your customers by your risk assessment firms.

4. If you are a mortgage broker, a construction company, corporation, real estate company or agent you also will need to add new legal disclaimers to all of your contracts and offerings for any investment or purchase potentially needing to last over five years disclosing that rapidly accelerating climate change could be a significant factor in determining the success or failure of any investment or purchase any client of yours may participate in. If you do not inform your clients who lose their properties or investments because of the primary and secondary consequences of climate change rapidly accelerating, they will be able to come back and sue you for their losses due to your failure to disclose significant investment horizon risks, negligence, or gross negligence. If you are a large organization that uses risk and threat assessment firms, you already have this generally nonpublic knowledge. If it can be shown that you were aware of this information at the time of previous contracts or purchases, you could be sued for any climate change losses going back to the original time you were informed of these severe risks and threats to your customers by your risk assessment firms. The big Mortgage brokers (like Cohen Financial Group, Loan Factory, Inc., Sunnyhill Financial, Inc., Truss Financial Group LLC, Convoy Home Loans), large construction companies (like Turner Construction Company, Bechtel Corporation, Kiewit Corporation, Fluor Corporation, The Whiting-Turner Contracting Company), and leading real estate companies, (like Compass, Inc., Anywhere Advisors (Anywhere Real Estate), 3. eXp Realty, HomeServices of America, The Real Brokerage, Inc.) will need to quickly update their contracts.

5. If you are a politician: If you are currently denying climate change or working for the financial interests of the dead-end global fossil fuel cartel and its sub-industries, you are on the wrong side of history. Soon, as conditions deteriorate, you will be personally blamed and held accountable by your constituents for your actions. Your least severe consequence will be removal from all political offices.

6. If you are involved in Silicon Valley's fundraising for new technologies to reverse or slow climate change (like Andreessen Horowitz (a16z), Sequoia Capital, Accel, New Enterprise Associates (NEA), Dragoneer Investment Group) you will have to redo all of your investment documents and disclosures to account for the new forecasts above and the fact that climate change is so accelerated over the incorrect IPCC AR6 forecasts, which you are probably already using. Although no credible technology currently exists to end or reduce climate change and save half of humanity by 2050, any new technology will have to counterbalance far more heat and greenhouse gases faster than IPCC AR6 forecasts to be viable.

7. If you are an official in a city, state, or national government, you will need to begin planning for sooner and more intense structural stresses on key governmental systems, infrastructure repair, and upgrading and repair or rebuilding costs, which will be put on your water, water treatment, sewage, electrical, emergency services, and disaster recovery services. You will not be facing more "natural" disasters. You will be facing a human-made, fossil-fuel-driven, escalating series of previously avoidable catastrophes that will increase in frequency, severity, and scale.

8. If you are involved in well-funded military or intelligence agency planning, despite what the politicians in many of your countries are publicly saying about climate change being a hoax, you are already aware of our forecast numbers in the above article, and you are secretly preparing the procedures of martial law and new emergency powers to control the coming climate chaos. As the primary and secondary consequences of climate change first increase dramatically and then exponentially, the military establishment worldwide will have ever-increasing difficulty conducting normal operations and resupply. (If you are not in a well-funded military or intelligence agency, our forecasts above will allow you to have the same information your well-funded peers have, so that you can make whatever necessary adjustments you will need to make.)

9. If you are an insurance company executive, (like Allianz SE – Germany, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. – United States, China Life Insurance (Group) Company – China, Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Ltd. – China, Prudential Financial United States), you will need to accelerate your already ongoing process of canceling even more insurance policies for homes and businesses in medium to high-risk areas and transfer those coverage and rebuilding costs onto local, state, and national governments. Your corporation will quickly go bankrupt due to the rapid increase in the frequency, intensity, and scale of climate change impacts, well beyond what has been projected in IPCC AR6 forecasts. Senior insurance company executives who do not mitigate climate change risks will be rapidly replaced by those who do, as the next major, escalating climate catastrophe approaches.

10. If you are a billionaire, your top-tier risk analysis firm has already given you the confidential information found in our new forecast. If you are Elon Musk or Jeff Bezos, establishing a colony on Mars or another planet will not be a viable option for you and your families in the near term, given the climate and Polycrisis. If you are like many other billionaires currently involved in the wildly self-serving philosophy called Longtermism and your plans are to transfer your consciousness into computers on a space station to survive the polycrisis and climate change emergency, good luck with that. If you're one of the other hundreds of garden-variety billionaires whose solution to the coming global catastrophes and chaos is to set up a multimillion-dollar survival bunker and security-rich compound, you're in for some very painful surprises. Click here to read about the foolish future and horrible fate of the billionaires who do not take responsibility for their wealth and help humanity solve the climate change emergency and the other parts of the Polycrisis, which will get far worse very, very fast as the climate emergency disrupts normal systems.

Consider items three through nine above as an official public legal and public notice to the industries and entities described above, to alter their current behavior, contracts, disclosures, etc., due to the many legal, financial, physical, and even political risks and threats revealed in this article. These new forecasts will be widely distributed worldwide and quickly become common knowledge. Any reasonable legal due diligence would promptly identify and disclose the implied risks and consequences to the entities and organizations described in sections 3 through 10 above.

9. Nine things you can do about this climate change consequence and temperature forecast nightmare

Please do all the following actions if possible. They are also all part of a comprehensive Plan B.

1. Get busy with our Plan B emergency preparations, adaptations, resilience building, and if necessary, migration before it is too late! If you wait too long, you will not be able to find what you need, or it will cost far more.

2. Push your politicians to reach the honest required global fossil fuel reduction targets, so that we may save as much of humanity as still is possible.

3. Vote politicians supporting policies that deny the reality of the accelerating climate change emergency out of office as fast as possible. Because of their climate change emergency denial policies, they will make the unconscionable pain of accelerating climate change consequences cost far more, hurt far more, and last far longer.

4. Don't be fooled by all the ridiculous media-hyped new technology, new carbon capture progress nonsense. In one form or another, to keep you from realizing how bad things are going to get, you will keep hearing that "new technology carbon capture will save us at the last minute. This nonsense is just more cleverly disguised fossil fuel cartel disinformation designed to keep you and the world from immediately and radically cutting back on fossil fuel use, cutting its profits, and starting your emergency preparations. (Click here to read about this clever carbon capture false hope and popular media deception.)

5. Never forget that escalating climate change is the central and major controlling factor, fueling, amplifying, and multiplying most of the worst consequences of the other 12 global crises of the global polycrisis now facing humanity. We do not know which of the 12 global crises might occur before accelerating climate change consequences lead to widespread global collapse. (The same Plan B advice we provide on this website for preparing for and adapting to climate change will also apply brilliantly to preparing for the other 12 global crises.)

6. As part of your emergency preparations, adaptation, resilience-building, and possible Plan B migration, it is also important to build a strong local community around you that will have your back. We helped cofound a nonprofit organization, ClimateSafe Villages, to support you in this effort. Click here to learn more about our partner nonprofit, ClimateSafe Villages, which provides individualized support.

7. Push other environmental and climate organizations to advocate for the establishment of some form of global governance to help safeguard humanity. Without a new global entity emerging with the power to make and enforce transnational climate change laws, the accelerating global warming emergency (as evidenced by 60 years of total government failure) is beyond the ability of any individual or collective group of nations to negotiate or resolve.

Here is why? Individual nations will continue to do precisely as they are doing now. They will lie, cheat, and delay the reductions in fossil fuel emissions required. They will do everything possible to maintain their competitive advantage. Only the evolution of a new type of global governance entity will ultimately solve the climate change emergency.

8. Share this article and forecast with everyone you can, particularly the people and organizations listed in the section just above in items 3 to 9. (Members do not do this at this time until we give you the final OK that the document is ready for public distribution, other than our members.)

9. Donate or become a supporting member, and help Job One maintain uncensored independent climate change analysis and research. If you do so, for a very reasonable amount, you will be able to access all types of additional members-only reports on the climate change emergency that wealthy individuals and corporations pay tens of thousands of dollars a year to risk analysis firms for similar information.

10. Some Contrarian good news about the future of climate change, humanity, and Mother Nature's surprise support and assistance.

It is highly improbable that our government will act in time to prevent mass human extinction, massive financial loss, and suffering by about 2050. Despite massive efforts to get our governments to do so, they have avoided truly effective action for over 60 years. We have already reached the point of catastrophic, irreversible climate change, and we have entered phase 2 of global warming. Therefore, to maintain emotional balance and sanity, it is essential to consider every possible way humanity could escape this situation, given the government's ongoing failure to act.

While it is theoretically possible for the consequences of accelerating climate change to reduce the human population to 15% to 5% of the current population (if our governments continue for another 10-20 years without making the required radical reductions in fossil fuel use), this 15% to 5% reduction outcome is highly improbable for two reasons:

1. Accelerating climate change will not destroy ALL of humanity. This is because Mother Nature (not geoengineering), in a unique and painful way, will also eventually help rescue humanity from its own self-destructive behavior. Directly and indirectly, due to the numerous accelerating primary and secondary consequences of climate change, Mother Nature's normal cause-and-effect reactions will significantly contribute to reducing the human population. Her actions will reduce the human population by about 50%, and that reduction will also reduce global fossil fuel use by nearly the same percentage. This consequence of climate change-enforced drop in global fossil fuel use, empowered by Mother Nature, will be just enough to save a good portion of humanity, hopefully as much as 50%. Click here to see how Mother Nature will save humanity from its own greedy politicians and fossil fuel companies.

2. There's also a reasonably high probability that sometime between 2035-45, when climate change's consequences have risen exponentially and are causing undeniable and unconscionable global chaos, havoc, and financial loss, our governments and politicians will finally act to make the required and honest radical fossil fuel cuts. While these "too little too late" government actions will not save about half of humanity, they will help further reduce global fossil fuel use, enabling as many of the remaining, surviving humans as possible to be saved.

There is an additional bit of contrarian good news regarding the climate change catastrophes humanity will have to endure because our government and politicians didn't listen to good science. It is likely that whatever portion of humanity survives past 2050 will probably be so traumatized by the chaos and widespread global collapse, suffering, and death that they will institute a never again strategy. They will carefully study the economic, social, and political causes that caused the greatest holocaust and disaster in human history, and then they will institute changes to those structures so there is no possibility of such a catastrophe occurring ever again to whatever remains of humanity.

To see 30+ reasons why the relationships, processes, and self-defeating contexts of the world's current climate change reduction processes make it all but impossible for our governments to act in time to prevent the loss of half of humanity by about 2050, click here.) These 30 reasons explain why the transition of human society from fossil fuel dependence to green energy generation has not progressed as it could have progressed, even though we could have achieved most green energy goals toward a complete transition decades ago.

11. Why are our climate change temperature and timeframe forecasts so different from the IPCC's forecasts?

It is important to note the significant differences between our climate temperature and timetable graph forecasts and the IPCC graphic forecasts listed above. It covers key processes, relational issues, and relevant transformational and computational issues in the IPCC forecasts. It covers key processes, errors and omissions, undisclosed patterns, external influences, relational issues, and relevant transformational and computational issues in IPCC forecasts.

1. We do not use the grossly underestimated IPCC's climate sensitivity number (ECS) of three (3°C for 2X atmospheric CO2); we use the far more accurate climate sensitivity of 4.5 °C presented by James Hansen, one of the world's preeminent climate scientists. Click here to learn more about this major factor in determining far more accurate temperature increase increases and timetables.

For decades, the IPCC has used and maintained a significantly underestimated estimate of the ECS at 3. We believe that the relentless, high-pressure influence of the global fossil fuel cartel on the UN and its staff also contributed to the IPCC's continued reliance on the lower ECS, despite newer science strongly supporting the higher ECS of 4.5. Click here for a detailed explanation of climate sensitivity and this controversy.

2. We never include or use the IPCC's calculations for new technology carbon capture, miraculously appearing effective in the distant future (2035-2050). Hyper-optimistic projections and allowances for new carbon capture technology are being used by the IPCC and governments worldwide to illegitimately justify LOWER global reductions in fossil fuel use, favoring the fossil fuel-producing nations and corporations that provide significant funding to the United Nations. In the IPCC in AR6, if you add only the total of the carbon capture human-made technologies (BECCS + DACCS), (and you exclude “natural” AFOLU options like afforestation/reforestation,) the median total gigatons of carbon removed from the atmosphere across these new technology carbon capture scenarios is about ≈ 357 GtCO₂ of technological CDR carbon capture over 2020–2100.

There is no credible science supporting anything close to removing 357 GtCO₂ from the atmosphere during that period. See this article for why. In our new forecasts, we have removed ALL the IPCC's dubious and unproven future human-technology carbon capture and removal totals used in various places in their AR6 forecast.

3. We always include reasonable, defensible, and even what would be considered conservative calculations for the accumulative and synergetic effects of climate change-triggered tipping points, activated feedback loops, and triggered nonlinear reactions common to the climate system and its subsystems. These types of reasonable allowance calculations are also largely absent from IPCC forecasts and projections of future global warming and impacts. In our low, medium, and high forecast scenarios, we allocated 0.15°C, 0.30°C, and 0.45°C, respectively, to the combined effects of tipping points, feedback loops, and nonlinear responses.

It is important to recognize that tipping points, feedbacks, and non-linear responses in the climate system and its subsystems do not occur in isolation. They are also interacting with other tipping points, feedback loops, and nonlinear responses across the climate change system and its subsystems.

They are the big amplifiers, multipliers, and disruptors of the climate system. These high-negative-consequence interactions can worsen in any combination of the following ways:

a. They can affect one another cumulatively, or

b. They can trigger an often unforeseen, rapid new cascade of consequences.

The near-total lack of reasonable calculations and allocations for the projected and potential effects of climate change tipping points, feedbacks, and nonlinear responses in climate change systems and sub-systems, and interacting and multiplying to amplify each other in the IPCC's "Perfect Day" forecasts, remains one of the most serious IPCC forecasting problems.

Most people do not understand that once a tipping point is crossed, a major feedback loop or non-linear reaction is activated; things do not get worse just a little bit faster! They get worse dramatically, or even exponentially faster, often leading to an unforeseen cascade of new consequences or a complete system crash.

When they start triggering each other across climate systems and subsystems, you have what is known as the Climageddon Feedback Loop. To help you understand this hugely dangerous "Perfect Day" tipping point, feedback loop, and non-linear reactions missing from calculations and temperature increasing allocations in most IPCC AR6 climate change forecasts and for humanity's future, we strongly recommend that you read this link about the Climageddon Feedback Loop, which discusses this IPCC "Perfect Day" problem involving tipping points, feedback loops, and nonlinear reactions in illustrated great detail. Once you understand the Climageddon Feedback Loop and how it has been ignored in the IPCC's AR6 forecast, you too may come to believe as we do that even with our additional reasonable allowances for tipping points feedback loops and non-linear reactions of 0.15°C, 0.30°C, and 0.45°C, respectively in our low medium and high forecasts, we believe we are still considerably below the correct average global temperature increases that will rapidly occur once the Climageddon Feedback Loop accelerates heavily from 2031 through 2045 or 2050

To understand the Climageddon Feedback Loop, it is also critically important to understand the nature and processes of tipping points, feedback loops, and nonlinear responses, as well as the 11 key climate change tipping points here.

4. Our calculations also demonstrate what happens with a realistic one, two, or three percent annual increase in global fossil fuel use. Currently, the fossil fuel industry attempts to conceal its actual annual growth rate to avoid further reduction regulations. Additionally, methane and nitrous oxide, both potent greenhouse gases, are poorly measured globally. Global fossil fuel use is expected to continue increasing at an annual rate of about 1-3% for some time. Our three levels of 1%, 2%, and 3% annual increases in global fossil fuel use also allow us to calculate an annual percentage growth rate that also compensates for the world's population. With population growth, economic growth demands, and massive political pressures from the fossil fuel cartel, there is no valid reason or evidence to believe that current annual global fossil fuel use will drop significantly or consistently over the next several decades.

We do not blindly assume, as many others do, that, as the world's population continues to grow about 1% per year (.85%), fossil fuel use will decrease significantly or continuously. When examining the evidence, annual global fossil fuel use has consistently and reliably increased by trend since the Industrial Revolution, which began around the 1800s. Fossil fuel production increased at an accelerating rate from 1900. The steady economic growth in GDP indicates that fossil fuel production will continue to increase at this rate. (For example, global fossil fuel consumption increased 1.5% 2022- 2023.)

5. Our calculations start at the baseline for the current increase in average global temperature, being 1.7°C, not the IPCC's current 1.47 °C baseline. Many agree we have reached at least the 1.5°C baseline. The Berkeley Earth dataset estimates that, for 20 24, the anomaly was ~1.62 °C ±0.06 °C above the 1850-1900 baseline. A new study sets the baseline for average global temperature at 1.7°C. (McCulloch, M. T. et al. (2024) – “300 years of sclerosponge thermometry shows global warming has exceeded 1.5 °C”, Nature Climate Change. Carbon Brief ) Even the IPCC AR6 report suggests there may be an upper limit to the current average global temperature of another 0.2°C, which is why we set our baseline at 1.7 °C. (Whether it's 1.62°C or 1.7°C, it won't make a significant difference in the final calculations, but we wanted to clearly disclose the baseline we used in all our calculations.)

6. We always account for the aerosol effect in our calculations. Here is the IPCC definition of aerosols. “Atmospheric aerosols may be composed of sea salt, organic carbon, black carbon (BC), mineral species (mainly desert dust), sulphate, nitrate, and ammonium or their mixtures. … They may be emitted as primary particulate matter or formed within the atmosphere from gaseous precursors (secondary production).” Here is why they are essential to be included in all climate change forecast calculations. Anthropogenic (fossil-fuel) aerosols have historically had a net cooling effect, meaning that some fraction of greenhouse gas warming has been masked by aerosol cooling. This complicates projections: if aerosols decline (e.g., due to clean air regulations), the masking effect may decrease, allowing faster warming. Many climate change forecasts do not include the aerosol effect.

In general, we strive to account for all major factors that may affect the climate change temperature and timing forecasts. However, do keep in mind that our forecasts encompass the six factors mentioned above, and the IPCC forecasts do not include all of these critical additional factors (except aerosols) that will determine our future. (If you want to read far more detail about all of the problems with the IPCC summary reports, like the forecast in AR6, it is fully explained on this page.) As you review and study our new temperature and timeframe forecasts and understand how they correct for mistakes, omissions, and other calculation issues in the IPCC summary reports, you will also begin to recognize the magnitude of the challenges humanity now faces.

12. More technical information, including the criteria, formulas, definitions, and the methodology we used in our forecasts, so that anyone can independently verify our newest forecasts.

Anyone with basic math skills (or a spreadsheet) can replicate our forecast using the definitions and steps described below.

1) Definitions (symbols & abbreviations)

- - $t$ : calendar year (e.g., 2025…2100).
  - $C_{0}$ : pre-industrial CO₂ (or CO₂-equivalent) reference concentration used in the forcing relation. We adopt 278 ppm (the canonical pre-industrial CO₂ value used in IPCC). IPCC
  - : CO₂-equivalent concentration at year $t$ (ppm). “CO₂-equivalent (CO₂-eq)” aggregates other GHGs to an equivalent forcing in CO₂ units. (Formal definition in AR6 Glossary.) IPCC
  - $C_{eq, 2025}$ : CO₂-eq in 2025 (assumption for our scenarios). We used 534 ppm CO₂-eq (documented assumption; not an AR6 single value).
  - $g$ : annual compound growth rate of CO₂-eq (fraction/yr): $0.01, 0.02, 0.03$ for 1%, 2%, 3%/yrscenarios.
  - $Δ T (t)$ : global mean surface air temperature anomaly at year $t$ vs. the 1850–1900 baseline (IPCC’s pre-industrial proxy). IPCC+1
  - ECS: Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity (°C per CO₂ doubling). AR6 assesses a best estimate ~3.0 °C (likely range 2.5–4.0 °C); we deliberately used 4.5 °C (Hansen) as a sensitivity test you requested. IPCC+2IPCC+2
  - Anchor $Δ T (2025)$ : observed/assessed anomaly in 2025; we used 1.7 °C (assumption for alignment).
  - Adder: conservative extra warming by 2100 (+0.15 / +0.30 / +0.45 °C) to represent under-represented tipping/feedback/non-linear processes (permafrost carbon, wetland CH₄, sink weakening, etc.), scaled linearly from 2025 → 2100 (your “Low/Medium/High” adders).
  - No-CDR: no carbon-dioxide removal (no BECCS/DACCS/land CDR) included.

Note on the physics link that IPCC uses: the canonical CO₂ radiative forcing relation is
$Δ F = α ln (C / C_{0})$ with $α \approx 5.35 W m^{-2}$ (Myhre et al.)—this is the underlying reason the logarithm of $C / C_{0}$ appears in temperature emulators. We skip the explicit $Δ F$ step and use a compact temperature form with ECS (next section). IPCC+1

2) Sequence of formulas

Step A — CO₂-equivalent growth (by scenario)

For each growth case $g \in {0.01, 0.02, 0.03}$ and for each year $t$ :

$C^{eq} (t) = C^{eq, 2025} (1 + g)^{t - 2025}$

- - - Inputs: $C_{eq, 2025} = 534 ppm (assumed)$ ; $g = 0.01, 0.02, 0.03$ .
    - Notes: This is a scenario assumption (compound growth of total GHG forcing proxy). IPCC AR6 provides full emissions/concentration pathways (SSPs) but does not prescribe a fixed % growth; we are constructing alternative “what-if” growth paths.

Step B — Logarithmic temperature response using ECS

A compact, IPCC-consistent mapping from concentration (or CO₂-eq) to equilibrium temperature is:

$Δ T^{ECS} (t) = ECS ln 2 ln ( C ^{eq} ( t ) / C ^{0} )$

- - - Rationale: doubling $C$ raises $T$ by ECS. The log structure matches IPCC’s forcing relation. AR6 discusses ECS, TCR, and emulator use extensively. IPCC+1
    - Values: $C_{0} = 278 ppm$ (pre-industrial CO₂), from IPCC; ECS = 4.5 °C (your Hansen test value; AR6 best estimate is 3.0 °C). IPCC+1

(If you wish to derive this from explicit forcing: $Δ F = 5.35 ln (C / C_{0})$ and a climate feedback parameter $λ$ , with $ECS = Δ T_{2 \times C O 2} = Δ F_{2\times} / λ$ . Using $Δ F_{2\times} = 5.35 ln 2$ , the compact ECS-log form follows. IPCC)

Step C — Anchor to observed 2025 anomaly

To ensure agreement with the observed 2025 state (independent of any small mismatch in $C_{eq, 2025}$ or ECS),

$Δ T^{anch} (t) = Δ T^{ECS} (t) + [1.7^{\circ} C - Δ T^{ECS} (2025)]$

- - - Sets $Δ T_{anch} (2025) = 1. 7^{\circ} C$
    - This is a common emulator practice when aligning simple physics to an empirical baseline.

Step D — Add conservative “under-represented processes” warming

For your Low/Med/High adders, we ramp linearly from 0 °C at 2025 to a small end-century offset:

$Adder (t) = Adder^{2100} \times 2100 - 2025 t - 2025, Adder_{2100} \in {0.15, 0.30, 0.45}^{\circ} C$

- - - Motivation (from AR6): several amplifying processes are under- or not fully represented in the central CMIP6 projections (e.g., permafrost carbon, wetland CH₄ amplification, sink weakening, select tipping cascades). You asked to include a defensible allowance; these adders implement that choice. (AR6 treats much of this in qualitative/high-end storylines.) IPCC

Step E — Final temperature series (for plotting & tables)

$Δ T^{final} (t) = Δ T^{anch} (t) + Adder (t)$

- - - This is what the figures/tables report for each (growth, adder) combination.

Step F — Five-year table values

For the tabular outputs (2025, 2030, …, 2100), we simply sample or interpolate $Δ T_{final} (t)$ at 5-year steps:

$Δ T^{5yr} (y) = Δ T^{final} (y), y \in {2025, 2030, \dots, 2100}$

(If the internal series is annual, linear interpolation at exact 5-year marks yields the same values.)

Step G — Threshold-crossing years

For thresholds $T\*∈{2,3,4,5,6,7} ∘C$ , the first year crossing is:

$tcross(T\) = min⁡{ t: ΔTfinal(t) ≥ T\ }$

- - - These are the dates shown in your summary tables and the “what tips when” mapping.

Which numbers come from IPCC AR6, and where

Quantity / concept	Value used	Where AR6 backs it	Notes
Pre-industrial baseline period	1850–1900	AR6 WG1 Technical Summary & Ch.1 use this as the pre-industrial proxy baseline for GMST/GSAT. IPCC+1	We express all warming vs. this baseline.
Pre-industrial CO₂ $C_{0}$	278 ppm	AR6 context; widely cited in AR6/peer literature. IPCC	Used as the reference $C_{0}$ in log relations.
ECS (AR6 assessed)	Best est. ≈ 3.0 °C; likely 2.5–4.0 °C	AR6 WG1 Ch.7 & Fig. 1.16. IPCC+1	We use 4.5 °C (Hansen)intentionally—as a test scenario per your direction.
Forcing–CO₂ log structure	$Δ F = α ln (C / C_{0})$ , $α \approx 5.35$ W m⁻²	IPCC (via Myhre et al.)—used throughout assessments. IPCC	Our compact ECS–log $Δ T$ form is consistent with this physics.
CO₂-equivalent definition	Formal AR6 definition	AR6 WG1 Annex VII Glossary. IPCC	We treat $C_{eq}$ as a forcing proxy to include non-CO₂ GHGs.
Under-represented feedbacks & tipping risks	Qualitative in central projections	AR6 WG1 assesses feedbacks/tipping risks; many are not fully in CMIP6 medians. IPCC	This motivates our small end-century adders.

Values not from AR6 (explicitly your scenario choices): ECS = 4.5 °C, $C_{eq, 2025} = 534$ ppm, growth $g = 1, 2, 3%$ , and the adder endpoints $+ 0.15/ + 0.30/ + 0.45° C$ by 2100.

What the four final figures plotted

Combined plot – all 9 curves: $Δ T_{final} (t)$ for each $g \in {1%, 2%, 3%}$ crossed with adder tiers ${0.15, 0.30, 0.45}^{\circ} C$ .
2–4) Three per-growth plots – for 1%, 2%, 3% cases, each showing Low/Med/high adders.

All curves are the direct evaluation of Steps A → E above.

Replication tips (spreadsheet-ready)

- - Row of years: 2025…2100.
  - CO₂-eq: $C_{eq} (t) = 534 \times (1 + g)^{t - 2025}$ .
  - Raw temp: $Δ T_{ECS} (t) = 4.5 \times ln (C_{eq} (t) /278) / ln 2$ .
  - Anchor: add $[1.7 - Δ T_{ECS} (2025)]$ to every year.
  - Adder: $0.15$ (or $0.30$ / $0.45$ ) $\times (t - 2025) /75$ .
  - Final: sum anchored temp + adder.
  - Threshold year: find first $t$ where Final ≥ {2,3,4,5,6,7}.

Caveats

- - This is an exploratory, decision-support emulator, not a full ESM.
  - Using CO₂-eq with the ECS log mapping is a standard heuristic for rapid policy exploration; full AR6 projections use scenario-dependent concentrations/forcings and complex feedbacks. IPCC
  - The adder terms are conservative allowances grounded in AR6’s discussion of under-represented processes; they are not claiming a specific AR6 numeric value.

13. Bibliography, additional methods, and sources.

Here are the sources we drew on (or their direct equivalents) when we built your IPCC-AR6–adjusted, high-ECS, tipping-point-aware climate forecast (4.5 ECS, 1.7 °C baseline, added feedbacks/non-linearities, removal of speculative CDR, aerosol adjustment, and 1–3% fossil growth scenarios).

They are grouped by their roles in the analysis, so you can see how each cluster contributed to the final forecast. It captures the main scientific pillars we used.

1. Core IPCC AR6 and SR1.5 sources

IPCC AR6 Working Group I – Physical Science Basis

IPCC. (2021). Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the IPCC. Cambridge University Press. Especially:
- Chapter 1: Framing, context and methods
- Chapter 4: Future global climate: Scenario-based projections and near-term information
- Chapter 5: Global Carbon and Other Biogeochemical Cycles and Feedbacks
- Chapter 7: The Earth’s energy budget, climate feedbacks, and climate sensitivity (incl. ECS ranges and aerosol effective radiative forcing, Figure 7.6)
- Technical Summary
- Summary for Policymakers

IPCC AR6 Working Group III – Mitigation & CDR

IPCC. (2022). Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the IPCC. Cambridge University Press. Key parts:
- Chapter 1: Introduction and framing (discussion of mitigation pathways and CDR legacy from AR5)
- Chapter 3: Mitigation pathways compatible with long-term goals (Illustrative Mitigation Pathways and heavy reliance on CDR in many scenarios)
- Technical Summary
IPCC. (2022). Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) Factsheet. IPCC AR6 WGIII outreach. (Used for summary numbers and the statement that all 1.5–2 °C scenarios rely on CDR.)

IPCC SR1.5 (for carbon budgets & pathway logic)

Rogelj, J., Shindell, D., Jiang, K., et al. (2018). Mitigation Pathways Compatible with 1.5°C in the Context of Sustainable Development. In: Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report. (Chapter 2; used for the linear T–ΣCO₂ framing and early carbon budget numbers.)

2. Observed warming & justification for a ~1.7 °C starting point

McCulloch, M. T., Winter, A., Sherman, C. E., et al. (2024). 300 years of sclerosponge thermometry shows global warming has exceeded 1.5 °C. Nature Climate Change, 14, 171–177.
World Meteorological Organization (WMO). (2024). State of the Global Climate 2023. Confirms ~1.45 °C above pre-industrial for 2023.
World Meteorological Organization (WMO). (2025). State of the Global Climate 2024. Confirms 2024 as warmest year on record at ~1.55 ± 0.13 °C above pre-industrial.

Together, these underpinned our argument that “true” anthropogenic warming is already edging toward ~1.6–1.7 °C, once observational biases and late-19th-century baseline issues are accounted for.

3. High climate sensitivity and aerosol masking (Hansen & aerosols)

Hansen’s revised ECS and accelerated warming

Hansen, J. E., Sato, M., Simons, L., et al. (2023). Global warming in the pipeline. Oxford Open Climate Change, 3(1), kgad008.

Used for:
- ECS estimate around 4.8 °C per CO₂ doubling;
- Strong role of aerosol masking and recent acceleration as aerosols decline;
- Implied decadal warming rates (~0.27 °C/decade and up).
News summary referencing Hansen’s higher ECS and “2 °C target is dead” framing: The Guardian (2025). “Climate change target of 2C is 'dead', says renowned climate scientist.”

Aerosol forcing constraints

IPCC AR6 WGI Chapter 7 and Figure 7.6 – assessed effective radiative forcing from aerosols and total anthropogenic forcing.
Bellouin, N., Quaas, J., Gryspeerdt, E., et al. (2020). Bounding global aerosol radiative forcing of climate change. Reviews of Geophysics, 58(1), e2019RG000660.
Stevens, B. (2015). Rethinking the lower bound on aerosol radiative forcing. Journal of Climate, 28(12), 4794–4819.

These gave us the plausible aerosol-masking range and justified using Hansen-style higher net climate forcing when aerosols decline.

4. Tipping points, feedbacks, and non-linear responses

Lenton, T. M., Rockström, J., Gaffney, O., et al. (2019). Climate tipping points – too risky to bet against. Nature, 575, 592–595.
Armstrong McKay, D. I., Staal, A., Abrams, J. F., et al. (2022). Exceeding 1.5 °C global warming could trigger multiple climate tipping points. Science, 377(6611), eabn7950.
Global Tipping Points Project. (2023). Global Tipping Points Report 2023. University of Exeter Global Systems Institute.
IPCC AR6 WGI. Chapters 1, 4, 11 and cross-chapter boxes on abrupt change and tipping points (non-linear responses and low-likelihood, high-impact outcomes).

These sources informed your tipping-point feedback “adder” and our decision to lean away from linear warming responses, especially beyond ~1.5–2 °C.

5. Carbon budgets and remaining space to 1.5–2 °C (before your ECS/tipping adjustments)

Lamboll, R. D., Nicholls, Z., Meinshausen, M., et al. (2023). Assessing the size and uncertainty of remaining carbon budgets. Nature Climate Change, 13, 650–658.
IPCC SR1.5, Chapter 2 (Rogelj et al., 2018) – canonical carbon budget ranges and pathway logic.
IPCC AR6 WGI, Chapter 5 and associated FAQ on carbon budgets and carbon cycle feedbacks.

We used these as the baseline AR6/SR1.5 carbon budgets, then tightened them to reflect:

higher ECS (~4.5–4.8 °C),
stronger feedbacks,
and a more realistic non-ideal climate response.

6. Emissions growth, fossil-fuel trajectories, and “1–3% per year” framing

Global emissions datasets

Global Carbon Project. (2023). Fossil CO₂ emissions at record high in 2023.
Global Carbon Project. (2025). Fossil fuel CO₂ emissions hit record high in 2025.
UNEP. (2023). Emissions Gap Report 2023: Broken Record. United Nations Environment Programme.
IEA. (2024). CO₂ Emissions in 2023. International Energy Agency. (Executive Summary: global energy-related CO₂ emissions +1.1% in 2023.)
Stanford / Global Carbon Budget summary: Friedlingstein et al. (2023) and Stanford Earth news item on record 2023 fossil emissions.

These supported the empirical range of recent emissions growth (~1%/yr) and underpinned our 1%, 2%, 3% annual fossil-fuel growth scenarios for sensitivity testing.

7. Negative emissions / CDR critique and removal of “phantom” carbon capture

To strip out the unrealistic volumes of future carbon capture embedded in many IPCC IAM scenarios, we leaned on:

Anderson, K., & Peters, G. (2016). The trouble with negative emissions. Science, 354(6309), 182–183.
Smith, P., Davis, S. J., Creutzig, F., et al. (2016). Biophysical and economic limits to negative CO₂ emissions.Nature Climate Change, 6(1), 42–50.
Fuss, S., et al. (2018). Negative emissions – Part 3: Innovation and upscaling. Environmental Research Letters, 13(6), 063003. (Used via review summaries on innovation and scaling challenges.)
Rueda, O., et al. (2021). Negative-emissions technology portfolios to meet the 1.5 °C target. Global Environmental Change, 68, 102262. (For ranges of total CDR in SSP pathways, including values ~1,000+ GtCO₂.)
IPCC AR6 WGIII Chapter 3 and CDR factsheet (as above) for quantitative CDR volumes embedded in 1.5–2 °C scenarios.

These informed your CDR “subtraction step”, where we treated much of the late-century negative emissions in IAMs as speculative and re-computed pathways without assuming hundreds to 1,000+ GtCO₂ of successful engineered removal.

8. Non-linear extremes, system behaviour, and open-system “acceleration” framing

IPCC AR6 WGI, Chapter 11: Weather and climate extreme events in a changing climate – for intensification of extremes and compound events.
Global Tipping Points Report 2023 and related coverage (e.g., on coral reefs already crossing tipping thresholds around 1–1.5 °C).
Hausfather, Z. (2025). The great acceleration debate. The Climate Brink. (Used conceptually to frame the emerging evidence of post-2010 acceleration and the debate over how strong that signal is.)

These helped justify non-linear adjustments to AR6’s smoother projections and support the idea that recent warming may already be running ahead of many CMIP6/AR6 central estimates.

9. “Meta” and context sources (mitigation feasibility & scenario families)

Carbon Brief. (2022). In-depth Q&A: The IPCC’s Sixth Assessment on how to tackle climate change. (Interprets WGIII pathways, including statements about peaking before 2025 and rapid declines.)
Riahi, K., et al. (2022). Mitigation Pathways Compatible with Long-term Goals. IPCC AR6 WGIII Chapter 3 (core IAM scenario set).
Kriegler, E., et al. (2018). Pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C: a tale of turning around in time. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A, 376(2119), 20160457. (Used conceptually for pathways with minimal overshoot and limited CDR.)
Skeptical Science / Hausfather et al. (2025). Moving away from high-end emissions scenarios. (Used to cross-check the plausibility of worst-case emissions vs current policy.)

14. Other related notes

1. Our new climate change temperature and timeframe forecasts above continue to support and expand the projections from the work we did in summarizing the MIT Club of Rome collapse report and the subsequent three other verification reports relevant to the MIT original, as well as our additions of the climate change factors into the other verification reports on the projected dates and major factors of global collapse. Below, please find an illustration of the global collapse time frames when various global collapse factors are combined, based on the five MIT collapse-related studies. It then includes our newest forecasts of climate change consequences and timeframes.

In very small black-and-gray print below, you can see that in 2000 there were 6.2 billion people, in 2030 8.1 billion, and in 2100 1.5 billion. Using the three links below, you can view the information from the original MIT study and the three later studies that redid the original MIT work and re-verified its calculations. In the process of reading the three MIT collapse-related articles below, you can see that, in the third link, we included calculations from the four previous studies and adjusted their charts with the latest climate change consequences and time-frame information. In the chart below, you can also see that it is not only Job One For Humanity that is predicting that at about 2030, all hell begins to break loose from about 2030 until about 2050. From 2050 to 2070, the global collapse and crash of the human population continues but begins to level out. We strongly recommend that you do not skip the three MIT collapse-related articles below.

Here are the links to our three articles in our MIT Club of Rome collapse series:

Part 1: Global Collapse: Probabilities, Factors, and Timetables. Was MIT right?

Part 2: Was the Club of Rome & MIT study right about soon-arriving resource shortages and the collapse of humanity?

Part 3: When will global civilization collapse due to accelerating climate change AND the verified Club of Rome/MIT studies' global collapse factors?

2. Our forecast above is significantly worse than our original timetable and temperature forecast in our 2016 white paper, "Climageddon," and it is also considerably worse than the updates we have made since 2016 on our website. When we published our Climageddon white paper, which stated that if radical fossil fuel cuts were not made immediately, reducing global fossil fuel use by about75% by 2025, about half of humanity would perish by 2050. This is now further supported by our new medium and high-scenario forecasts, and to some degree by our low-scenario forecast.

3. The following illustration will help support our three levels of projection for increases in annual global fossil fuel use.

4. The following UCAR chart will help you see how the IPCC predicts how different levels of annual global fossil fuel use will affect average global temperature.

5. These new forecasts above were published by the nonprofit, and 100% publicly funded climate change think tank Job One For Humanity, in collaboration with the Universe Institute.

6. If you recalculate using our criteria to find above and the formulas defined above, and you find any discrepancies, please let us know at ([email protected]).

7. AI was used to assist in collecting climate change news research and reviewing it, as well as verifying our forecasts presented above. We used AI to identify any findings in the current climate change research that could make our forecast inaccurate or unreasonable in light of current climate science. When AI accounted for all factors, it could not identify any factor that would move our forecasts outside the reasonable range.

8. In our forecasts above, we realize that for many, you have encountered very different temperatures, timetables, and forecasts than those you are repeatedly hearing from your government or the media. There are many good reasons for these significant differences. Most of them are fully explained on this page about the IPCC's climate change underestimation crisis.

9. One can reasonably extrapolate or infer, when reviewing the above two IPCC graphs and the materials in this link is that the IPCC AR6 forecasts are plagued by:

a. intentional and unintentional omissions and errors, and "cooked" carbon accounting,

b. IPCC administrator cowardice,

c. intense political influence and interference, and

d. the massive power of fossil fuel cartel influence, disinformation, and greed.

The fact that most of the world has been led to believe the IPCC's three-scenario forecast in AR6 is factual, or at least close to it, has condemned humanity to mass extinction, widespread global collapse, and decades to centuries of near-unbearable climate instability, making the lives of future generations all but unbearable.

10. This article was worked on by Lawrence Wollersheim, lead DMAP analyst, and other climate change researchers who wish to remain anonymous because of the ongoing harassment of many climate change scientists who go public with climate change facts disliked by the global fossil fuel cartel.

11. We fully expect to be attacked with denial of service and hacking attacks once again for making this upsetting but accurate information on climate change consequences and timetables available. By having all the information we used to come to our new forecast transparently disclosed and available, it will make it much easier to defend ourselves from the global vested fossil fuel cartel interests we expect to attack us once again through their trolls and proxies.

15. Useful additional reading and links

Here are more critical links to understand the current reality of the climate change extinction threat:

“Global warming in the pipeline” (Hansen et al., 2023) — abstract page at NASA GISS: per-W/m² sensitivity = 1.2 ± 0.3°C → ~4.8°C for CO₂ doubling. giss.nasa.gov Full article PDF (as archived online): “Global warming in the pipeline.” canadiancor.com

To help you understand this critical and dangerous factor in climate change forecasts and for humanity's future, we strongly recommend that you read our link on the Climageddon Feedback Loop, which discusses this IPCC problem in great detail.

We also recommend reading the following links on the 11 major climate change tipping points, feedback loops, and nonlinear reactions, which provide more detail on many of the threats. This link will explain the four tipping points that will lead to mass human extinction.)

Click here for the definition of irreversible global warming and an explanation of how we have reached phase 2 of this horrible situation.

Click here for the four extinction-driving climate tipping points.

Click here for an overview of climate-driven processes leading to global collapse and mass to near-total extinction. Here, you will see a cascade of nearly 80 primary and secondary climate change consequences unfolding and interacting with humanity's 12 other current major global crises. After reading this page, you will understand why the extinction of half of humanity by 2050 is already an unavoidable reality and that all that remains now is to fight to prevent our near-total extinction.

Click here to see precisely how the IPCC "cooked the fossil fuel reduction calculations" and grossly skewed the current IPCC global fossil fuel reduction calculations by including unproven, non-existent, and unscalable "carbon-sucking unicorn" technology into their projections.

Click here to review the long-term history of the IPCC underestimating the consequences, timeframes, and the needed global fossil fuel reduction targets by as much as 30-60% or more. This page and its linked pages will help explain why the current 2025 global fossil fuel reductions are so severe, as they aim to compensate for the 60-plus years that society has delayed and failed to implement the gradual reductions in fossil fuel use required.

Click here to see the latest 2022 IPCC climate change summary report on the critical climate sensitivity error.

To see 30+ reasons why the relationships, processes, and self-defeating contexts of the world's current climate change reduction processes make it all but impossible for our governments to act in time to prevent the loss of half of humanity by about 2050, click here.) These 30 reasons explain why the transition of human society from fossil fuel dependence to green energy generation has not progressed, even though we could have achieved most green energy goals toward a complete transition decades ago.

Directly and indirectly, the obscene greed of the global fossil fuel cartel has been the invisible hand and powerful vested financial interest creating a delusional and grossly incorrect framing of the climate change emergency and of climate change consequences and time frames put out by the IPCC. These actions have significantly made it all but impossible for society and our governments to develop effective solutions to the climate change emergency. Click here to read and see the documentation for why the previous statement is not hyperbole.

The latest focus for the global fossil fuel cartel appears to be co-opting many areas of the climate change movement. The latest COP 30 conference appears to have had so many fossil fuel-related issues affecting the policies framing and discussions that the conference was almost completely derailed. Fossil fuel cartel members or their representatives are making their way onto the boards of more and more climate change and environmental education organizations as well.

Our forecasts above and our website contain significant, difficult news about our current climate change emergency; please do not think we have given up hope on this challenging task. There are numerous significant benefits to be realized by addressing climate change. When you're done reading this page, be sure to read the following link first, then proceed to the next link. They will help you maintain realistic hope and the balance we all need to overcome the climate challenge together. (The second article has been read by several million people.)

Do you like this page?

What would an honest, long-term climate change consequence and timetable forecast look like if you removed all the errors, omissions, and political trickery found in current UN and IPCC climate change summary reports?

2. How to compare our new forecasts with the United Nations IPCC's current climate change, temperature, and timetable forecasts from now until 2100

3. Critical information about our four new climate change temperature and timeframe forecast graphs to help you grasp the seriousness of the IPCC's current forecasting inaccuracy problem

7. A critical time frame review of the most destructive tipping points, feedback loops, and non-linear reactions which are likely to unfold within the climate and its subsystems.

At only a 2 °C increase in average global temperature

At only a 3 °C increase in average global temperature

At only a 4 °C increase in average global temperature

At only a 5 °C increase in average global temperature

At only a 6 °C increase in average global temperature

At only a 7 °C increase in average global temperature

How to read/apply the above tipping point, feedback loop, and non-linear reaction section for the climate and its subsystems.

8. What does this new forecast mean to your future finances, businesses, personal goals, and survival?

9. Nine things you can do about this climate change consequence and temperature forecast nightmare

12. More technical information, including the criteria, formulas, definitions, and the methodology we used in our forecasts, so that anyone can independently verify our newest forecasts.

1) Definitions (symbols & abbreviations)

2) Sequence of formulas

Step A — CO₂-equivalent growth (by scenario)

Ceq(t) = Ceq,2025 (1+g) t−2025Ceq​(t)=Ceq,2025​(1+g)t−2025​

Step B — Logarithmic temperature response using ECS

ΔTECS(t) = ECS ln⁡ ⁣(Ceq(t)/C0)ln⁡2ΔTECS​(t)=ECSln2ln(Ceq​(t)/C0​)​​

Step C — Anchor to observed 2025 anomaly

ΔTanch(t) = ΔTECS(t) + [ 1.7 ∘C − ΔTECS(2025) ]ΔTanch​(t)=ΔTECS​(t)+[1.7 ∘C−ΔTECS​(2025)]​

Step D — Add conservative “under-represented processes” warming

Adder(t) = Adder2100×t−20252100−2025,Adder2100∈{0.15, 0.30, 0.45} ∘CAdder(t)=Adder2100​×2100−2025t−2025​​,Adder2100​∈{0.15,0.30,0.45} ∘C

Step E — Final temperature series (for plotting & tables)

ΔTfinal(t) = ΔTanch(t) + Adder(t)ΔTfinal​(t)=ΔTanch​(t)+Adder(t)​

Step F — Five-year table values

ΔT5yr(y) = ΔTfinal(y),y∈{2025,2030,…,2100}ΔT5yr​(y)=ΔTfinal​(y)​,y∈{2025,2030,…,2100}

Step G — Threshold-crossing years

tcross(T\*) = min⁡{ t: ΔTfinal(t) ≥ T\* }tcross​(T\*)=min{t: ΔTfinal​(t) ≥ T\*}​

Which numbers come from IPCC AR6, and where

What the four final figures plotted

Combined plot – all 9 curves: ΔTfinal(t)ΔTfinal​(t) for each g∈{1%,2%,3%}g∈{1%,2%,3%} crossed with adder tiers {0.15,0.30,0.45}∘C{0.15,0.30,0.45}∘C.2–4) Three per-growth plots – for 1%, 2%, 3% cases, each showing Low/Med/high adders.

Replication tips (spreadsheet-ready)

Caveats

1. Core IPCC AR6 and SR1.5 sources

2. Observed warming & justification for a ~1.7 °C starting point

3. High climate sensitivity and aerosol masking (Hansen & aerosols)

4. Tipping points, feedbacks, and non-linear responses

5. Carbon budgets and remaining space to 1.5–2 °C (before your ECS/tipping adjustments)

6. Emissions growth, fossil-fuel trajectories, and “1–3% per year” framing

7. Negative emissions / CDR critique and removal of “phantom” carbon capture

8. Non-linear extremes, system behaviour, and open-system “acceleration” framing

9. “Meta” and context sources (mitigation feasibility & scenario families)

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$C^{eq} (t) = C^{eq, 2025} (1 + g)^{t - 2025}$

$Δ T^{ECS} (t) = ECS ln 2 ln ( C ^{eq} ( t ) / C ^{0} )$

$Δ T^{anch} (t) = Δ T^{ECS} (t) + [1.7^{\circ} C - Δ T^{ECS} (2025)]$

$Adder (t) = Adder^{2100} \times 2100 - 2025 t - 2025, Adder_{2100} \in {0.15, 0.30, 0.45}^{\circ} C$

$Δ T^{final} (t) = Δ T^{anch} (t) + Adder (t)$

$Δ T^{5yr} (y) = Δ T^{final} (y), y \in {2025, 2030, \dots, 2100}$

$tcross(T\) = min⁡{ t: ΔTfinal(t) ≥ T\ }$

Combined plot – all 9 curves: $Δ T_{final} (t)$ for each $g \in {1%, 2%, 3%}$ crossed with adder tiers ${0.15, 0.30, 0.45}^{\circ} C$ .
2–4) Three per-growth plots – for 1%, 2%, 3% cases, each showing Low/Med/high adders.